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ABSTRACT  
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have many potential applications [1, 5] and unique challenges. They 
usually consist of hundreds or thousands small sensor nodes such as MICA2, which operate 
autonomously; conditions such as cost, invisible deployment and many application domains, lead to small 
size and limited resources sensors [2]. WSNs are susceptible to many types of link layer attacks [1] and 
most of traditional networks security techniques are unusable on WSNs [2]; due to wireless and shared 
nature of communication channel, untrusted transmissions, deployment in open environments, unattended 
nature and limited resources [1]. So, security is a vital requirement for these networks; but we have to 
design a proper security mechanism that attends to WSN's constraints and requirements. In this paper, we 
focus on security of WSNs, divide it (the WSNs security) into four categories and will consider them, 
include: an overview of WSNs, security in WSNs, the threat model on WSNs, a wide variety of WSNs' link 
layer attacks and a comparison of them. This work enables us to identify the purpose and capabilities of 
the attackers; also, the goal and effects of the link layer attacks on WSNs are introduced. Also, this paper 
discusses known approaches of security detection and defensive mechanisms against the link layer 
attacks; this would enable it security managers to manage the link layer attacks of WSNs more effectively. 
KEYWORDS  
Wireless Sensor Network (WSN), Security, Link Layer, Attacks, Detection, Defensive Mechanism 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Advances in wireless communications have enabled the development of low-cost and low-
power wireless sensor networks (WSNs) [1]. WSNs have many potential applications [1, 5] and 
unique challenges. They usually are heterogeneous systems contain many small devices, called 
sensor nodes, that monitoring different environments in cooperative; i.e. sensors cooperate to 
each other and compose their local data to reach a global view of the environment; sensor nodes 
also can operate autonomously. In WSNs there are two other components, called "aggregation 
points" and "base stations" [3], which have more powerful resources than normal sensors. 
Aggregation points collect information from their nearby sensors, integrate them and then 
forward to the base stations to process gathered data, as shown in figure1. limitations such as 
cost, invisible deployment and variety application domains, lead to requiring small size and 
limited resources (like energy, storage and processing) sensors [2]. Also, WSNs are vulnerable 
to many types of attacks and due to unsafe and unprotected nature of communication channel [4, 
9, 22], untrusted and broadcast transmission media, deployment in hostile environments [1, 5], 
automated nature and limited resources, the most of security techniques of traditional networks  
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are impossible in WSNs; therefore, security is a vital and complex requirement for these 
networks. It is necessary to design an appropriate security mechanism for these networks [5, 6],  
which attending to be WSN's constraints. This security mechanism should cover different 
security dimension of WSNs, include confidentiality, integrity, availability and authenticity. The 
main purpose of this paper is presenting an overview of different link layer attacks on WSNs 
and comparing them together. In this paper, we focus on security of WSNs and classify it into 
four categories, as follows: 
• An overview of WSNs, 
• Security in WSNs include security goals, security obstacles and security requirements of 
WSNs, 
• The threat model on WSNs, 
• A wide variety of WSN's link layer attacks and comparison them to each other, include 
classification of WSN's link layer attacks based on threat model and compare them to each 
other based on their goals, results, strategies, detection and defensive mechanisms; 
This work makes us enable to identify the purpose and capabilities of the attackers; also, the 
goal, final result and effects of the attacks on the WSNs. We also state some available 
approaches of security detection and defensive mechanisms against these attacks to handle 
them. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in section 2 is presented an overview of 
WSNs; while section 3 focused on security in WSNs and presents a diagram about it; section 4 
considers the threat model in WSNs; section 5 includes definitions, strategies and effects of link 
layer attacks on WSNs; in section 6 is considered WSNs' link layer attacks, their goals, effects, 
possible detection and defensive mechanisms, and extracts their different features, then 
classifies the link layer attacks based on extracted features and compares them  to each other; 
and finally,  in section 7, we present our conclusion. 
Figure 1.  WSN's architecture 
 
2. OVERVIEW OF WSNS 
In this section, we present an outline of different dimensions of WSNs, such as definition, 
characteristics, applications, constraints and challenges; as presented in following subsections 
(subsection 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4). 
 
2.1. Definition and suppositions of WSNs 
A WSN is a heterogeneous system consists of hundreds or thousands low-cost and low-power 
tiny sensors to monitoring and gathering information from deployment environment in real-time  
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[6, 7, 8]. Common functions of WSNs are including broadcast and multicast, routing, 
forwarding and route maintenance. The sensor's components are: sensor unit, processing unit,  
storage/memory unit, power supply unit and wireless radio transceiver; these units are 
communicating to each other, as shown in following figure (figure2). The existing components  
on WSN's architecture are including sensor nodes (motes or field devices that are sensing data), 
network manager, security manager, aggregation points, base stations (access point or gateway) 
and user/human interface. Besides, there are two approaches in WSN's communication models 
containing hierarchical WSN versus distributed [6] and homogeneous WSN versus 
heterogeneous [6]. Some of common suppositions of these networks are:  
• Insecure radio links [8, 9, 10],  
• Packet injection and replay [8, 9],  
• Non tamper resistant [10],  
• Many normal sensor nodes (high-density) and low malicious nodes, 
• Powerful attackers (laptop-class) [10, 20]. 
 
Figure 2.  WSN's node architecture 
 
2.2. WSNs characteristics and weakness 
Most important characteristics of WSNs are including: 
• Constant or mobile sensors (mobility),  
• Sensor limited resources [4, 18] (limited range radio communication, energy, computational 
capabilities [4]), low reliability, wireless communication [4] and immunity,  
• Dynamic/unpredictable WSN's topology and self-organization [4, 21],  
• Ad-hoc based networks [8, 19] and hop-by-hop communication (multi-hop routing) [11, 12, 
21],  
• Non-central management, autonomously and infrastructure-less [8],  
• Open/hostile-environment nature [8, 10] and high density; 
 
2.3. WSN's applications 
In general, there are two kinds of applications for WSNs including, monitoring and tracking [8]; 
therefore, some of most common applications of these networks are: military, medical, 
environmental monitoring [2, 6, 8], industrial, infrastructure protection [2, 8], disaster detection 
and recovery, agriculture, intelligent buildings, law enforcement, transportation and space 
discovery (as shown in figure3: a and b). 
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                          (a)                            (b) 
Figure 3.  WSN's applications
 
2.4. Vulnerabilities and challenges of WSNs 
WSNs are vulnerable to many kinds of attacks; some of most important reasons are including:  
• Theft (reengineering, compromising and replicating),  
• Limited capabilities [13, 14] (DoS attacks risks, constraint in using encryption),  
• Random deployment (hard pre-configuration) [13, 22],  
• Unattended nature [13, 19, 21, 22]; 
In continue this section states most common challenges and constraints in WSNs; include: 
• Deployment on open/dynamic/hostile environments [19, 20, 22] (physical access, capture 
and node destruction); 
• Insider attacks; 
• Inapplicable/unusable traditional security techniques [2, 14, 22] (due to limited 
devices/resources, deploying in open environments and interaction with physical 
environment); 
• Ad-hoc based deployment [19, 20] (dynamic structure and topology, self-organization); 
• Resource scarcity/hungry [4, 17, 22] (low and expensive 
communication/computation/processing resources); 
• Immense/large scale (high density, scalable security mechanism requirement); 
• Unreliable communication [4, 22] (connectionless packet-based routing  unreliable 
transfer, channel broadcast nature  conflicts, multi-hop routing and network congestion 
and node processing  Latency); 
• Unattended operation [9, 20] (Exposure of physical attacks, managed remotely, no central 
management point); 
• Redesigning security architectures (distributed and self-organized); 
• Increased attacks' risks and vulnerabilities [22], new attacks, increased tiny/embedded 
devices, multi-hopping routing (selfish) [21]; 
• Devices with limited capabilities [15, 16], pervasiveness (privacy worries), wireless 
(medium) [4, 13, 22] and mobility; 
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3. SECURITY IN WSNS 
Now, intrusion techniques in WSNs are growth; also there are many methods to disrupt these 
networks. In WSNs, data accuracy and network health are necessary; because these networks 
usually use on confidential and sensitive environments. There are three security key points on  
WSNs, including system (integrity, availability), source (authentication, authorization) and data 
(integrity, confidentiality). Necessities of security in WSNs are: 
• Correctness of network functionality; 
• Unusable typical networks protocols [2, 19]; 
• Limited resources [4, 22, 24]; 
• Untrusted nodes [4, 19, 20]; 
• Requiring trusted center for key management [19], to authenticating nodes to each other 
[25], preventing from existing attacks and selfishness [24, 26] and extending collaboration; 
 
3.1. Why security in WSNs? 
Security in WSNs is an important, critical issue, necessary and vital requirement, due to: 
• WSNs are vulnerable against security attacks [22, 23] (broadcast and wireless nature of 
transmission medium); 
• Nodes deploy on hostile environments [19, 20, 22] (unsafe physically); 
• Unattended nature of WSNs [9, 20]; 
 
3.2. Security issues 
This section states the most important discussions on WSNs; it is including key establishment, 
secrecy, authentication, privacy, robustness to DoS attacks, secure routing and node capture [13, 
19]; 
3.3. Security services 
There are many security services on WSNs; but some of their common are including encryption 
and data link layer authentication [17, 19, 20, 24], multi-path routing [19, 21, 24, 25], identity 
verification, bidirectional link verification [19, 21, 25] and authenticated broadcasts. 
 
3.4. Security protocols 
This section presents the most common security protocols of WSNs, containing: 
• SNEP: Secure network encryption protocol (secure channels for confidentiality, integrity by 
using authentication, freshness); 
• µTESLA [6, 19] (Micro timed, efficient, streaming, loss-tolerant authentication protocol, 
authentication by using asymmetric authenticated broadcast); 
• SPIN (Sensor protocols for information via negotiation): The idea behind SPIN is to name 
the data using high-level descriptors or meta-data. Before transmission, metadata are 
exchanged among sensors via a data advertisement mechanism, which is the key feature of 
SPIN. Each node upon receiving new data, advertises it to its neighbors and interested 
neighbors, i.e. those who do not have the data, retrieve the data by sending a request 
message. There is no standard meta-data format and it is assumed to be application specific. 
There are three messages defined in SPIN to exchange data between nodes, include: ADV 
message to allow a sensor to advertise a particular meta-data, REQ message to request the 
specific data and DATA message that carry the actual data [11, 21]; 
• Broadcasts of end-to-end encrypted packets [24, 25] (authentication, integrity, 
confidentiality, replay); 
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As figure4 shows, the most important dimensions of security in WSNs are including security 
goals, obstacles, constraints, security threats, security mechanisms and security classes; 
however, this paper considers only star spangled parts/blocks to classify and compare WSNs' 
link layer attacks based on them; i.e. security threats (including availability, authenticity,  
integrity and confidentiality) and security classes (containing interruption, interception, 
modification and fabrication); as shown in table3. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  Security in WSNs 
 
4. THREAT MODEL IN WSNS 
There are many classes of WSNs' attacks based on nature and goals of attacks or attackers; but, 
in this section we present and compare their most important classes (called threat model of 
WSNs); as presented in following subsections (subsection 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4). 
 
4.1. Attacks based on damage/access level 
In this subsection is presented the classifications of WSNs' link layer attacks based on their 
damage level or attacker's access level, including: 
 
4.1.1. Active attacker: this kind of attacker does operations, such as: 
• Injecting faulty data into the WSN; 
• Impersonating [2, 8]; 
• Packet modification [19]; 
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• Unauthorized access, monitor, eavesdrop and modify resources and data stream; 
• Creating hole in security protocols [20]; 
• Overloading the WSN; 
 
Some of most goals and effects of these attacks are: 
• The WSN functionality disruption; 
• The WSN performance degradation; 
• Sensor nodes destruction; 
• Data alteration; 
• Inability in use the WSN's services; 
• Obstructing the operations or to cut off certain nodes from their neighbors; 
 
4.1.2. Passive attacker: passive attacker may do following functions; 
• Attacker is similar to a normal node and gathers information from the WSN; 
• Monitoring and eavesdropping [2, 20] from communication channel by unauthorized 
attackers; 
• Naturally against privacy; 
The goals and effects of this kind of attacker include: 
• Eavesdropping, gathering and stealing information; 
• Compromised privacy and confidentiality requirements; 
• Storing energy by selfish node and to avoid from cooperation; 
• The WSN functionality degradation; 
• Network partition by non-cooperate in operations; 
 
4.2. Attacks based on attacker location 
Attacker can be deployed inside or outside the WSN; if the attacker be into the WSN's range, 
called insider (internal), and if the attacker is deployed out of the WSN's range, called outsider 
(external). This subsection presented and classified the WSNs' link layer attacks based on 
attackers' location, including: 
 
4.2.1. External attacker (outsider): some of the most common features of this type of attacks 
are: 
• External to the network [2, 19] (from out of the WSN range); 
• Device: Mote/Laptop class; 
• Committed by illegally parties [2, 7]; 
• Initiating attacks without even being authenticated; 
Some of common effects of these attacks are including: 
• Jamming the entire communication of the WSN; 
• WSN's resources consumption; 
• Triggering DoS attacks; 
 
4.2.2. Internal attacker (insider): the meaning of insider attacker is: 
• Main challenge in WSNs; 
• Sourced from inside of the WSN and access to all other nodes within its range [2, 5, 7]; 
• Authorized node in the WSN is malicious/compromised; 
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• Executing malicious data or use of cryptography contents of the legitimate nodes [19, 20]; 
• Legitimate entity (authenticated) compromising a number of WSN's nodes; 
Some of most important goals of these attacks type are: 
• Access to cryptography keys or other WSN codes; 
• Revealing secret keys; 
• A high threat to the functional efficiency of the whole collective; 
• Partial/total degradation/disruption; 
 
4.3. Attacks based on attacking devices 
Attackers can use different types of devices to attack to the WSNs; these devices have different 
power, radio antenna and other capabilities. There are two common categories of them, 
including: 
 
4.3.1. Mote-class attacker: mote-class attacker is every one that using devices similar to 
common sensor nodes; this means, 
• Occurring from inside the WSN;  
• Using WSN's nodes (compromised sensor nodes) or access to similar nodes/motes (which 
have similar functionality as the WSN's nodes) [7, 8]; 
• Executing malicious codes/programs; 
Mote-class attacker has many goals, such as: 
• Jamming radio link; 
• Stealing and access to cryptography keys; 
 
4.3.2. Laptop-class attacker: laptop-class attacker is every one that using more powerful 
devices than common sensor nodes, including: 
• Main challenge in WSNs; 
• Using more powerful devices by attacker, thus access to high bandwidth and low-latency 
communication channel; 
• Traffic injection [2]; 
• Passive eavesdrop [19] on the entire  WSN by a single laptop-class device; 
• Replacing legitimate nodes; 
Laptop-class attackers have many effects on WSNs, for example: 
• Launching more serious attacks and then lead to more serious damage; 
• Jamming radio links on the WSN entirely (by using more powerful transmitter); 
• Access to high bandwidth and low-latency communication channel; 
 
4.4. Attacks based on function (operation) 
Link layer attacks in WSNs have been classified into three types, based on their main 
functionality; this subsection presented them, include:  
 
4.4.1. Secrecy: its definition and techniques are: 
• Operating stealthy on the communication channel; 
• Eavesdropping [4, 20]; 
• Packet replay, spoofing or modification; 
• Injecting false data into the WSN [5, 6]; 
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• Cryptography standard techniques can prevent from these attacks; 
Goals and effects of this kind of attacks are: 
• Passive eavesdrop; 
• Packet replication, spoofing or modification; 
 
4.4.2. Availability: this class of attacks known as Denial of Services (DoS) attacks; which leads 
to WSNs' unavailability, degrade the WSNs' performance or broken it. Some of the most 
common goals and effects of this attacks' category are including: 
• Performance degradation; 
• The WSN's services destruction/disruption; 
• The WSN useless/unavailable; 
 
4.4.3. Stealthy: this kind of attacks is operating stealthy on the communication channel; such as: 
• Eavesdropping [2, 8, 20]; 
• False data injection into the WSN; 
The most important effects of these attacks are including: 
• Partial/entire degradation/disruption the WSN's services and functionality; 
 
Table 1.  Threat model of WSNs 
Attack category/ 
features 
Types Damage level1 Ease of identify2 Attacker presence3 
Based on damage level Active attacker High Easy Explicit Passive attacker Low Hard Implicit 
Based on attacker location External (outsider) Low Medium Implicit Internal (insider) High Hard Implicit 
Based on attacking devices Mote-class attacker Low Hard Implicit Laptop-class attacker High Easy Explicit 
Based on attack function 
Secrecy High Hard Implicit 
Availability High Hard Both 
Stealthy High Hard Implicit 
 
As shown in table1, damage level of link layer attacks on WSNs can be high (serious effect on 
the WSN) or low (limited effect on the WSN); besides, the attackers identification can be easy 
(possible), medium or hard (impossible), depending on that kind of attack; also the attackers' 
presence or attacks' effects can be explicit (serious damage) or implicit (for example, 
eavesdropping). 
 
5. DEFINITIONS, STRATEGIES AND EFFECTS OF LINK LAYER ATTACKS ON 
WSNS 
WSNs are designed in layered form; this layered architecture makes these networks susceptible 
and lead to damage against many kinds of attacks. For each layer, there are some attacks and 
defensive mechanisms. Thus, WSNs are vulnerable against different link layer attacks, such as 
DoS attacks, Collision, unfairness and other attacks to link layer protocols [2, 19]; WSNs are 
susceptible to link layer attacks. Attackers can gain access to transmission media, create radio  
                                                
1
 damage level: high (serious or more damage than other type) and low (limitary); 
2
 ease of identify attackers: easy (possible), medium (depending on attack type) and hard (impossible or not as easy to prevent as 
other ones); 
3
 attacker presence or attack's effect: explicit (more powerful attacker, then more serious damage/harm) and implicit; 
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interference, prevent from legitimate sensor nodes to communicate/transmit (access to the 
communication channel) or launch DoS attacks against link layer. Now, in table2 is presented  
the definitions of link layer attacks on WSNs, and then it classified and compared them to each 
others based on their strategies and effects. 
 
 
Table 2.  Link layer attacks on WSNs (classification and comparison based on strategies and effects) 
Attack/criteria Attack definition Attack techniques Attack effects 
Node outage 
• Stopping the functionality 
of WSN's components, such 
as a sensor node or a 
cluster-leader; 
• Physically4 ; 
• Logical5 ; 
• Stop nodes' services; 
• Take over/compromise the 
partial/entire the WSN and 
prevent from some 
communication; 
• Impossibility reading 
gathered information; 
• Launching other attacks; 
Link layer 
jamming 
• Finding data packet and to 
jam it[1]; 
• Looking at the probability 
distribution of the inter-arrival 
times between all types of 
packets; 
• This attack can be applied on 
S-MAC, B-MAC and L-MAC 
protocols [1]; 
• Colliding packets during 
transmission; 
• Exhausting nodes' resources; 
• Confusion; 
Collision 
• Message transmission by 
two nodes on a same 
frequency [1, 4], 
simultaneously; 
• There are 2 types 
collision: environmental 
and probabilistic collision; 
• Environmental collision; 
• Probabilistic collision; 
• Verifying and isolate radio 
transmissions; 
• Change packet's fields; 
• Alter the ack message; 
• Interferences [1]; 
• Data/control packets 
corruption/cripple [1]; 
• Discarding packets; 
• Energy  exhaustion; 
• Cost effective; 
Resource 
Exhaustion 
• Repeated collisions and 
continuous retransmission 
until the sensor node death 
[1]; 
• Continuously 
retransmission6; 
• Interrogation attack 
(RTS/CTS); 
• Message modification; 
• Ack corruption/change7; 
• Resources exhaustion; 
• Compromise availability; 
Traffic 
manipulation 
• Regular monitoring 
transmissions and 
computing some parameters 
based on affected MAC 
protocol carefully  time 
adjustment   transmitting 
messages just at the 
moment when normal 
nodes do so; 
• Similar to Collision 
attack; 
• Regular monitoring the 
communication channel and 
computing require parameters; 
• Misusing from the wireless 
nature of communications in 
WSNs; 
• Disobeying the coordination 
rules of MAC schemes in use; 
• Collision attack techniques; 
• Unfairness attack techniques; 
• Continuously collisions and 
unfairness; 
• Excessive packet collisions; 
• Artificially increased 
contention; 
• Decreasing signal quality and 
network availability; 
• Aggressively competition for 
channel usage; 
• Break the protocols' 
operations; 
• Unfair bandwidth usage; 
• Degradation of the WSN 
performance; 
• Traffic distortion; 
• Effects of collision and 
unfairness attacks; 
• Confusion; 
                                                
4
 capture and physically damage  stop functionality; 
5
 using other attacks such as collision or exhaustion or unfairness  node's resources exhaustion  stop node's functionality; 
6
 Continuously retransmit out-of-date/dead/corrupted packets; 
7
 Create noise/parasite/interference in acknowledgment messages; 
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Unfairness 
• Partial DoS attack8; 
• Using other attacks such 
as collision and exhaustion 
continuously; 
• Intermittent application of 
collision and exhaustion 
attacks; 
• Misusing/abusing a 
cooperative MAC-layer 
priority mechanism; 
• Continuously request to 
access to channel by attacker9; 
• Decrease utility and 
efficiency of services; 
• Nodes' hungry to channel 
access; 
• Limiting access to channel 
and undermine communication 
channel capacity; 
•  
Acknowledge 
spoofing 
• An adversary can spoof 
link layer 
acknowledgements (ACKs) 
of overheard packets [10]; 
• ACKs replication; 
• Forging/spoofing link layer 
ACKs of neighbor nodes; 
• False view/information of the 
WSN; 
• Launch selective forwarding 
attack; 
• Packet loss/corruption; 
Sinkhole 
• A special selective 
forwarding attack; 
• More complex than 
blackhole attack; 
• Attracting [4, 9] or draw 
the all possible network 
traffic to a compromised 
node by placing a malicious 
node closer to the base 
station [12] and enabling 
selective forwarding; 
• Centralizing traffic into 
the malicious node [18]; 
• Possible designing 
another attack during this 
attack; 
• Sinkhole detection is very 
hard10; 
• Luring [2] or compromising 
nodes [10]; 
• Tamper with application data 
along the packet flow path 
(selective forwarding); 
• Receiving traffic and altering 
or fabricating information 
[12]; 
• Identity spoofing for a short 
time; 
• Using the communication 
pattern; 
• Creating a large sphere of 
influence; 
• Based on used routing 
protocol: MintRoute or 
MultiHopLQI protocol; 
• Luring and to attract almost 
all the traffic; 
• Triggering other attacks, 
such as eavesdropping, trivial 
selective forwarding, 
blackhole and wormhole; 
• Usurp the base station’s 
position; 
• Message modification; 
• Information fabrication and 
packet dropping; 
• Suppressed messages in a 
certain area; 
• Routing information 
modification/fake; 
• Resource exhaustion; 
Eavesdropping11 
• Detecting the contents of 
communication by 
overhearing/stealthy 
attempt to data; 
• Interception; 
• Abusing of wireless nature 
of WSNs' transmission 
medium; 
• Using powerful resources 
and strong devices, such as 
powerful receivers and well 
designed antennas; 
• Launching other attacks 
(wormhole, blackhole); 
• Extracting sensitive WSN 
information; 
• Delete the privacy protection 
and reducing data 
confidentiality; 
Impersonation12 
• Malicious node 
impersonates a cluster 
leader and lures nodes to a 
wrong position;  
• Impersonating a node 
within the path of the data 
flow of attacker's interest 
by modifying routing data 
or implying itself as a 
trustworthy communication 
partner to neighboring 
nodes in parallel; 
• The WSN reconfiguration; 
• Access to encryption keys 
and authentication 
information; 
• Man-in-the-middle attack 
and fake MAC addresses; 
• Node replication [23]; 
• Physical access to the WSN; 
• False or malicious node 
attack techniques; 
• Sybil attacks techniques; 
• Misdirection/misrouting; 
• Modifying routing 
information; 
• Luring/convince nodes; 
• Routing information 
modification; 
• False sensor readings; 
• Making network congestion 
or collapse; 
• Disclose secret keys; 
• Network partition; 
• False and misleading 
messages generated; 
• Resources exhaustion; 
• Degrade the WSN 
performance; 
• Invasion; 
• Carrying out further attacks 
to disrupt operation of the 
                                                
8
 A weaker form of DoS attack; 
9
 Cheating/compromising in competition to access to communication channel; 
10
 because they use private, invisible and out-of-band channels; 
11
 Also called passive information gathering attack; a threat for data confidentiality; the most common attack against privacy; an 
adversary with powerful resources (powerful receiver and well designed antenna) can gather the data stream from the WSN, if they 
are not encrypted; 
12
 Also called identity spoofing or node replication [23] or multiple identity attacks; identity spoofing and play the role of other one 
[23]; the attacker assumes the identity of another node in the network, thus receiving messages directed to the node it fakes; 
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WSN; 
• Confusion and taken over the 
entire WSN; 
Wormholes 
• Tunneling [4, 10] and  
replicating messages from 
one location to another 
through alternative low-
latency links [1, 2], that 
connect two or more points 
(nodes) of the WSN with 
fast communication 
medium [21] (such as 
Ethernet cable, wireless 
communication or optical 
fiber), by colluding two 
active nodes (laptop-class 
attackers [2]) in the WSN, 
by using more powerful 
communication resources 
than normal nodes [3, 15] 
and establishing better real 
communication channels 
(tunnel); 
• Wormhole nodes operate 
fully invisible [15]; 
• Compromising/luring nodes 
[2] with false and forged 
routing information; 
• An attacker locates between 
two nodes and forwards 
messages between them; 
• Using out-of-band or high-
bandwidth fast [21] channel; 
• Wormholes may be used 
along with Sybil attack; 
• This attack may combines 
with selective forwarding or 
eavesdropping; 
• Routing disruption/disorder 
(false routes, misdirection and 
forged routing); 
• False/forged routing 
information; 
• Confusion and WSN 
disruption; 
• Enable other attacks; 
• Exploiting the routing race 
conditions; 
• Change the network 
topology; 
• Prevention of path detection 
protocol; 
• Packet destruction/alteration 
by wormhole nodes; 
• Changing normal messages 
stream; 
De-
synchronization 
• Disrupting the established 
connections  between two 
legitimate nodes by re-
synchronizing their 
transmission13; 
• Sending repeatedly forged or 
false messages; 
• Re-synchronizing 
transmissions; 
• Disrupt communication; 
• Go out the synchronization; 
• Resource exhaustion; 
Denial of Service 
(DoS) attacks 
• A general attack includes 
several types other attacks 
in different layers of WSN, 
simultaneously [28];  
• Reducing the WSN's 
availability [19, 28]; 
• Physical layer, link layer, 
routing layer, transport layer 
and application layer attacks 
techniques; 
• Effects of physical layer, link 
layer, routing layer, transport 
layer and application layer 
attacks; 
 
6. COMPARISON LINK LAYER ATTACKS ON WSNS 
WSNs are vulnerable against link layer attacks. Therefore, we have to use some techniques to 
protect data accuracy, network functionality and its availability. As a result, we require 
establishing security in WSNs with attention to requirements and limitations of these networks. 
 
6.1. Link layer attacks classification based on threat model of WSNs 
In this subsection, we have tried to compare the link layer attacks of WSNs based on attacks' 
nature and effects, attackers' nature and capabilities, and WSN's threat model; as shown in 
following table (table3). 
Table3 shows the most important known attacks on WSNs; this table has three columns, 
including security class, attack threat and WSNs' threat model. Our purpose of security class is 
the nature of attacks, includes interruption, interception, modification and fabrication. Attack 
threat shows which security service attacked or security dimension affected, includes 
confidentiality, integrity, authenticity and availability. The threat model of WSNs has three sub-
columns, that they are presenting attackers' features and capabilities, including based on attacker  
 
                                                
13
 In link layer: using different neighbors to time synchronization; In transport layer: an established connection between two end 
points can be disrupted by de-synchronization; 
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location (internal/insider or external/outsider), based on attacking devices (mote-class or laptop-
class) and based on attacks on WSN's protocols, include active attacks and passive attacks;  
active attacks are targeting availability (packet drop or resource consumption), integrity 
(information modification) and authenticity (fabrication); passive attacks are aiming 
confidentiality (interception). 
 
Table 3.  WSN's link layer attacks classification based on WSNs' threat model 
Attacks/features Security class14 Attack threat15 
Threat model16 
Attacker 
location 
Attacking 
device 
Attacks on 
WSN's 
protocols 
Node outage Modification Availability, integrity External Both Active 
Link layer jamming Modification Availability, integrity External Both Active 
Collision Modification Availability, integrity External Both Active 
Resource 
Exhaustion Modification 
Availability, 
integrity External Both Active 
Traffic 
manipulation Modification 
Availability, 
integrity External Both Active 
Unfairness Modification Availability, integrity External Both Active 
Acknowledge 
spoofing 
Fabrication, 
modification 
Integrity, 
authenticity Both Both Active 
Sinkhole Modification, fabrication 
Availability, 
integrity, 
authenticity 
Both Both Active 
Eavesdropping Interception Confidentiality External Both Passive 
Impersonation 
Interception, 
fabrication, 
modification, 
Availability, 
integrity, 
confidentiality, 
authenticity 
External Both Active 
Wormholes Fabrication, interception 
Confidentiality, 
authenticity External Both Active 
Desynchronization Modification, fabrication 
Availability, 
authenticity External Both Active 
Denial of Service 
(DoS) attacks 
Interruption, 
interception, 
modification, 
fabrication 
Availability, 
integrity, 
confidentiality, 
authenticity 
Both Both Active 
 
 
Following figure (figure5) shows the nature of WSN's link layer attacks; it compares these 
attacks based on their nature by presents the percentage of WSNs' link layer attacks which based 
on interruption, interception, modification or/and fabrication; as a result, the nature of the most 
of these attacks is modification (almost 85 percent of them). 
 
                                                
14
 Security class: the nature of attacks; include interruption, interception, modification and fabrication; 
15
 Attack threat: security service attacked; threaten/affected security dimension; include confidentiality, integrity, authenticity and 
availability; 
16
 Threat model: based on attacker location or access level (internal/insider or external/outsider), based on attacking devices (mote-
class or laptop-class) and based on damage/attacks on WSN protocols include active attacks (availability (packet drop or resource 
consumption), integrity (information modification) and authenticity (fabrication)), passive attacks (confidentiality (interception)); 
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Figure 5.  Comparison link layer attacks based on their nature 
 
Following diagram (figure6) shows a comparison of WSNs' link layer attacks based on their 
security threats factors including confidentiality, integrity, authenticity and availability, in 
percentage; for example, it presents almost 31 percent of security threat of WSNs' link layer 
attacks is confidentiality and the nature of 38.4 percent of them is fabrication (fabricating data 
or identity). As shown in figure6, the aim of the most WSNs' link layer attacks is attacking 
integrity and availability. 
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Figure 6.  Comparison link layer attacks based on affected security dimension 
 
Following figure (figure7) shows a comparison link layer attacks based on the threat model of 
WSNs; As shown figure7, the occurred percentage of WSNs' link layer attacks, in attacker 
location, are 23 percent internal and 100 percent external; i.e. most of WSNs' link layer attacks 
are occurring from out of WSNs' range and attackers can trigger them by mote-class or laptop-
class devices. Also, it presents most of link layer attacks on WSNs are active, except 
eavesdropping; i.e. almost 92 percent of WSNs' link layer attacks are active. Besides, figure7 
shows least attacks on link layer of WSNs are internal attacks. 
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Figure 7.  Comparison link layer attacks based on the threat model 
 
6.2. Link layer attacks comparison based on their goals and results 
In link layer, attacker can disrupt the WSN's functionality by tampering with link layer 
services such as modifying MAC (Media Access Control) protocol, interference in 
communication channel and replicating/altering data frames. As shown in table4, it 
categorizes the link layer attacks of WSNs, based on their goals, effects and results. Also table4 
compares WSNs' link layer attacks based on attack or attacker purpose (including passive 
eavesdrop, disrupt communication, unfairness, authorization and authentication), requirements 
technical capabilities (such as radio, battery, powerful receiver/antenna and other high-tech and 
strong attacking devices), vulnerabilities, main target and final result of attacks. Besides, the 
contributors of all following link layer attacks (shown in table4) are one or many compromised 
motes, pc or laptop devices on WSNs. The vulnerabilities of these attacks can be physical 
(hardware), logical or their both; Attacks' main target may be physical (hardware), logical (lis: 
logical-internal services or lps: logical-provided services) or their both. Final result of these 
attacks is including passive damage, partial degradation of the WSN functionality and total 
broken of the WSN's services or functionality. 
 
Table 4.  Link layer attacks comparison based on attacks' goals and their results 
Attacks/ 
features Purpose
17
 
Technical 
capability Vulnerability
18 Main 
target19 Final result
20 
Node outage Unfairness - Logical lis; lps PTDB21 
Link layer 
jamming [1] 
Disrupt 
communication Radio Logical lps PTDB 
Collision [1] Unfairness - Logical lis; lps PTDB 
Resource 
Exhaustion [1] Unfairness - Logical lis; lps PTDB 
                                                
17
 Purpose: passive eavesdrop, disrupt communication, unfairness, to be authorized, to be authenticated; 
18
 Vulnerabilities: physical (hardware), logical; 
19
 Main target: physical (hardware), logical (lis: logical-internal services or lps: logical-provided services); 
20
 Final result: passive damage, partial degradation of the WSN duty/functionality, service broken/disruption for the entire WSN 
(partial or total/entire degradation/broken/disruption of the services/resources/functionality of the WSN); 
21
 PTDB: Partial/Total Degradation/Broken; 
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Traffic 
manipulation Unfairness - Logical lis; lps PTDB 
Unfairness Unfairness - Logical lis; lps PTDB 
Acknowledge 
spoofing Unfairness - Logical lps PTDB 
Sinkhole [1] Unfairness - Logical lps PTDB 
Eavesdropping Passive eavesdrop 
of data 
powerful 
resources and 
strong devices22 
Logical lps 
Passive 
damage; partial 
degradation 
Impersonation All purpose Time and high-tech equipments 
Logical; 
physical 
Physical; 
Logical (lis 
and lps) 
Passive 
damage; PTDB 
Wormholes [1] 
Unfairness;  
to be authenticated; 
to be authorized 
- Logical lps 
Passive 
eavesdrop; 
PTDB 
De-
synchronization 
Disrupt 
communication; 
unfairness 
- Logical lis PTDB 
Denial of Service 
(DoS) attacks All purpose 
Radio; battery; 
time and high-
tech equipments 
Logical; 
physical 
Physical; 
Logical (lis 
and lps) 
Passive 
damage; PTDB 
 
Following figure (figure8) shows that how much percentage of WSNs' link layer attacks are 
happened by targeting the fairness, confidentiality, authentication, authorization and disrupt 
communication on WSNs' functionalities, services and resources; for example, almost 85 
percent of these attacks are aiming the fairness of WSNs, and then they lead to unfairness.  
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Figure 8.  Comparison link layer attacks based on attacks' purpose 
 
Figure9 is presenting the percentage of every one of kinds of link layer attacks vulnerabilities 
and their main target on WSNs, including: 15.4 percent of them are attacking the WSNs' 
hardware, 61.5 percent of them are aiming the WSNs' logical-internal services and 92.3 percent 
are targeting the logical-provided services by WSNs. Thus, most link layer attacks on WSNs 
have logical vulnerabilities and only almost 15.4 percent of them have physical harm/effects. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
22
 such as powerful receiver  and well designed antenna; 
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Figure 9.  Comparison link layer attacks based on their main target 
 
6.3. Detection and defensive strategies of WSNs' link layer attacks 
In following table (table5) a classification and comparison of detection and defensive techniques 
on WSNs' link layer attacks is presented. 
 
Table 5.  Link layer attacks on WSNs (classification based on detection and defensive mechanisms) 
Attack/criteria Detection methods Defensive mechanisms 
Node outage 
• Node disconnection from the network; 
• Regular monitoring and nodes' 
cooperation; 
• Existence interference in common 
operation of node; 
• Node destruction (physically); 
• Providing an alternative path; 
• Developing appropriate and robust 
protocols; 
• Defensive  mechanisms against physical and 
node capture attacks23; 
Link layer jamming • Misbehavior detection techniques
24; 
• False identity detection techniques; 
• Limiting the rate of MAC requests; 
• Use of small frames; 
• S-MAC defensive method [1]25; 
• L-MAC defensive method [1]26; 
• B-MAC defensive method [1]27; 
• Identity protection28; 
• Link layer encryption; 
Collision • Misbehavior detection techniques; 
• All countermeasures of jamming attack; 
• Error correction codes (such as CRC codes) 
[1]; 
• Time diversity; 
                                                
23
 Using tamper-proofing/tamper-resistant sensor packages; using special alerting hardware/software to the user; 
camouflaging/hiding sensors; 
24
 include adjustment back-off values, watchdogs/IDS on every node, iterative probing mechanisms, game theory,  misbehavior-
resilient back-off algorithm, and rating nodes based on replication rate or node's cooperation in communication; 
25
 preventing clustering based analysis by narrowing the distance between the two clusters; 
26
 making the estimation of the clusters more difficult by changing the slot sizes (used for packet transmission) pseudo-randomly as 
a function of time; 
27
 shortening the preamble in order to make its detection harder; 
28
 using cryptography-based authentication or false identity detection techniques such as Radio resource test (Sybil attack), position 
verification (detecting immobile attackers),  code attestation (differing executing code on malicious or compromised node rather 
than normal nodes  detecting attackers by validating executing code on nodes),  sequence checking and identity association 
(associating node identity with used keys on communication by that node); 
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Resource 
Exhaustion • Misbehavior detection techniques; 
• Limiting the MAC admission control rate 
[1]; 
• Random back-offs; 
• Using Time-Division multiplexing; 
• limiting the extraneous responses; 
• Protection of WSN ID and other 
information; 
Traffic 
manipulation • Misbehavior detection techniques; 
• Traffic analysis attack defenses; 
• Collision attack defenses; 
• Unfairness attack defenses; 
• Misbehavior detection techniques; 
• Identity protection; 
• Link layer encryption; 
• Limiting the rate of MAC requests; 
• Use of small frames; 
Unfairness • Misbehavior detection techniques; • Use of small frames [1, 2, 4]; 
Acknowledge 
spoofing • Misbehavior detection techniques; 
• Using another route; 
• Authentication, link layer encryption and 
global shared key techniques; 
 
Sinkhole 
• False routing information detection [3, 
18]; 
• Cooperating neighboring nodes to each 
other [18]; 
• Tree structure and verify by tree [18]; 
• Verify by Visual Geographical Map; 
• Detection on MintRoute [2]; 
• Geographical routing protocols; 
• Learning global map (if nodes are static and 
at known location); 
• Scalability; 
• Probabilistic next hop selection; 
• leveraging global knowledge29; 
• Verifying and to trust information that 
advertised of neighbor nodes; 
• Authentication, link layer encryption and 
global shared key techniques; 
• Routing access restriction (R) [3]; 
• Wormhole detection (W) [3]; 
• Key management (K); 
• Secure routing (S) [5]; 
Eavesdropping 
• Eavesdropping is a passive behavior, thus 
it is rarely detectable; 
• Misbehavior detection techniques; 
• Access control; 
• Reduction in sensed data details; 
• Distributed processing; 
• Access restriction; 
• Strong encryption techniques; 
Impersonation 
• False identity detection techniques 
(misbehavior detection techniques); 
• False routing information detection; 
• Collision detection techniques; 
• Strong and proper authentication techniques; 
• Using strong data encryption; 
• Secure routing protocols; 
• Central certificate authority; 
• Pair-wise authentication; 
• Network layer authentication; 
• Adopt validation techniques; 
• Identity protection; 
• Link layer encryption; 
• Limiting the rate of MAC requests; 
• Use of small frames for each packet; 
Wormholes 
• False routing information detection; 
• Wormhole detection [15]; 
• Combinational methods [15]30; 
• Packet leach/leashes techniques [1, 21, 
27]31; 
• MAD protocol and OLSR protocol [1, 21]; 
                                                
29
 mapping entire network topology by this information and continuously or periodically update the information of base station; 
misbehavior and serious changes in topology show a compromised node; learning global map (if nodes are static); place nodes at 
known locations; 
30
 such as radio waves and ultrasound, measuring distance between nodes and comparing packet send and receive time with 
threshold; 
31
 Geographical leashes and Temporal leashes  Physical monitoring of field devices and regular network monitoring by using 
source routing; monitoring system may use packet leach techniques; 
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• Packet leashes techniques [21, 27]; • Directional antennas [1, 26];  
• Multi-dimensional scaling algorithm 
(scalability) [1]; 
• Using local neighborhood information [1]; 
• DAWWSEN protocol [2]32; 
• Designing proper routing protocols 
(clustering-based and geographical routing 
protocols);  
• leveraging global knowledge; 
• Verifying information that announce of 
neighbor nodes; 
• Graphical Position System [26, 27]; 
• Ultrasound [26]; 
• Global clock synchronization33; 
• Combinational methods (such as radio 
waves and ultrasound); 
• Authentication, link layer encryption and 
global shared key techniques; 
• (R), (W), (K), (S) [3, 5]; 
De-synchronization • Strong and un-forgeable authentication 
mechanisms; 
• Strong authentication mechanisms34; 
• Time synchronization, cooperatively35; 
• Maintaining proper timing; 
Denial of Service 
(DoS) attacks 
• Detection methods of physical layer, link 
layer, routing layer, transport layer and 
application layer  attacks; 
• Defensive mechanisms of physical layer, 
link layer, routing layer, transport layer and 
application layer  attacks; 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
Security is a vital requirement and complex feature to deploy and extend WSNs in different 
application domains. The most security link layer attacks are targeting network security 
dimensions such as integrity, confidentiality, authenticity and availability. 
In this paper, we analyze different dimensions of WSN's security, present a wide variety of 
WSNs' link layer attacks and classify them; our approach to classify and compare the WSN's 
link layer attacks based on different extracted features of WSN's link layer, attacks' and 
attackers' properties, such as the threat model of WSNs, link layer attacks' nature, goals and 
results, their strategies and effects and finally their associated detection and defensive 
techniques against these attacks to handle them, independently and comprehensively.  Table6 
presents how much percentage of WSNs' link layer attacks are occurring based on any one 
attacks' classifications features. Figure10 shows most affected features of WSNs' link layer 
attacks. Our most important findings are including: 
• Discussion typical WSNs' link layer attacks along with their characteristics, in 
comprehensive; 
• Classification and comprehensive comparison of WSNs' link layer attacks to each other; 
• Link layer encryption and authentication mechanisms can protect against outsiders, mote-
class attackers and link layer attacks  such as link layer jamming, traffic manipulation and 
acknowledgement spoofing; 
• Encryption is not enough and inefficient for inside attacks and laptop-class attackers; but 
clustering protocols can provide most secure solutions against inside attacks and 
compromised nodes; 
• The link layer attacks are often launching combinational; 
 
                                                
32
 suspicious node detection by signal strength; a proactive routing protocol based on the hierarchical tree construction; 
33
 Using tight clock synchronization, but unfeasible for the majority of WSNs; 
34
 to control the identity and the integrity of packets; exchanging packets that are authenticated (including all control fields in the 
transport protocol header); 
35
 Using different neighbors for time synchronization; 
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• The different kinds of link layer attacks may be used same strategies; 
• The same type of defensive mechanisms can be used in multiple link layer attacks, such as 
misbehavior detection; 
• The accuracy of solutions against link layer attacks depends on the characteristics of the 
WSN's application domain; 
• As presented in table6, 84.6 percent of link layer attacks' nature is modification; 30.7 
percent of link layer attacks threaten confidentiality, etc; 
• As shown in figure10, the nature of 84.6 percent of WSNs' link layer attacks is 
modification; 76.9 percent of them are targeting integrity and availability; most of these 
attacks are out of the WSNs' range (external: 100 percent) and lead to high-level damages 
(active attacks: 92.3 percent); 84.6 percent of attacks' purpose is unfairness; 92.3 percent of 
link layer attacks' main target is WSNs' logical provided services; 
 
This work makes us enable to identify the purpose and capabilities of the attackers; also the 
goal, final result and effects of the attacks on the WSNs' functionality. The next step of our 
work is considering other attacks on WSNs. We hope by reading this paper, readers can have a 
better view of link layer attacks and aware from some defensive techniques against them; as a 
result, they can take better and more extensive security mechanisms to design secure WSNs. 
 
Table 6.  Occurred percentage of each attacks' classification features 
Attack or attacker feature Criteria Percent (percentage of occurred) 
Security class Interruption 7.6 
Interception 30.7 
Modification 84.6 
Fabrication 46.1 
Attack threat Confidentiality 30.7 
Integrity 76.9 
Availability 76.9 
Authenticity 38.4 
Threat model Attacker location Internal 23 
External 100 
Attacking device Mote-class 100 
Laptop-class 100 
Attacks on WSN's protocols Passive 7.6 
Active 92.3 
Attacker purpose Disrupt communication 30.7 
Authentication 23 
Authorization 23 
Passive eavesdrop 23 
Unfairness 84.6 
Attack main target Physical (hardware) 15.4 
Logical-internal services 61.5 
Logical-provided services 92.3 
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8. FUTURE WORKS 
We also can research about following topics: 
• Securing wireless communication links against eavesdropping, collision and DoS attacks; 
• Resources limitations techniques; 
• Using public key cryptography and digital signature in WSNs (of course with attention to 
WSN's constraints); 
• Countermeasures for combinational link layer attacks; 
• Designing proper link layer (MAC36) protocols for WSNs; 
• Optimizing existing WSNs' MAC protocols; 
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